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Becauseconsumption expenditure as a proportion of in-
'come declines as income increases, a VAT applied at a
uniform rate to all consumer purchases is obviously re-
gressive in its apparent distribution of tax liabilities over income
classes. However, the important question of VAT incidence does not
relate to this nominal distribution of VAT liabilities but to the
change in the distribution of disposable income which results from
the introduction of the VAT and the simultaneous, compensating
changes in other tax or governmental expenditure and transfer pro-
grams. Specifically, the issue here is the differential incidence of the
VAT-CIT substitution. A very different differential incidence could
result from other programs of substitution incorporating the VAT,
e.g., revenue-sharing grants (financed by the VAT) replacing local
property tax support of education.
The incidence of a VAT-CIT substitution is determined by other
elements besides nominal VAT incidence. Real incomes will be
altered by changes in factor earnings and by changes in the prices
of goods and services, resulting both from the reduction in the
CIT and from the compensating imposition of the VAT.
Apart from exceptional cases, the prices of consumption goods do
not change equiproportionally, as discussed previously. Hence, the
effects of the price adjustments on real household income will de-
pend on the composition of consumer expenditures. Families whose
consumption is dominated by commodities experiencing relatively
large price increases will be most adversely affected. It is certainly
not unreasonable to expect that the composition as well as the level
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offamily consumption expenditure will be a function of income,
and that this relationship will significantly affect the incidence of the
tax substitution. Thus, it is necessary to utilize information concern-
ing the composition of consumer expenditures by income class in
order to assess the distributional effects of the tax substitution.
Furthermore, unless the CIT savings are fully shifted forward, the
CIT reduction will imply increases in some or all nominal factor in-
comes. In the short run it is not unreasonable to assume that these
changes in income will accrue to owners of capital, as has been
assumed implicitly in the treatment of CIT shifting and revenue
yield. The full distributional effects of the tax change will then in-
corporate increases in the after-tax incomes of capital owners, who
can reasonably be expected to be concentrated at the upper end of
the income distribution. To quantify this effect, it is necessary to
determine the level of wealth and the portfolio composition of each
income class.1
Finally, in addition to increases in prices of consumption goods
and in the nominal incomes of owners of securities, any degree of
forward CIT shifting will bring about reductions in the price of
investment goods. These price reductions will not be offset by im-
position of the VAT since investment purchases are not themselves
subjected to a consumption-type VAT. Initially at least, this re-
duction in capital goods prices implies that the original, pre-tax-
substitution level of capital earnings can be maintained with a smaller
rate of nominal investment; the cost of the fixed bill of real invest-
ment purchases (as defined by the original investment final demand
vector) will have been reduced. The benefit to investors in physical
capital is simply this reduction in the nominal cost of the given net
investment bundle.
For example, assume that corporate enterprises were
incapital goods prior to the tax substitution
and earning $200,000 in profits before paying the CIT at a 50 per-
cent rate, leaving $100,000 in after-tax profits. If the CIT is re-
pealed and if the CIT reduction is shifted forward through lower
VAT-exclusive prices, there is in the short run no consequent change
in net profit income. However, if investment goods prices decline
1. Part of the increase in after-tax corporate profits will, of course, benefit
foreign holders of stock in U.S. corporations. This has, however, been ignored
in the distribution of after-tax profits by income class. Although this introduces
a bias into the analysis because it increases the apparent regressivity of the tax
substitution by overstating the nominal income gains of domestic owners of
stocks, the magnitude of this bias is expected to be small enough to be disre-
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by10 percent, the enterprises need spend only $900,000 to acquire
the same physical volume of capital goods. The savings of $100,000
represents unused funds, not obtainned at the sacrifice of capital
earnings. At least in the short run, under present assumptions, this
reduction in the cost of the fixed bill of capital goods purchases
must be treated as an increase in the real incomes of owners of
capital, since they will not suffer any offsetting reductions in their
income from capital. On the other hand, in the longer run, if the
CIT reduction is allowed to stimulate investment demand without
being offset by stringent monetary policy and increased interest
rates, the medium-short-run effect may be a rise in the price of
investment goods in response to increased demand and limited
supply.
In the classical case of zero forward shifting of the CIT, imply-
ing that capital earnings are indeed quasi-rents, capital goods prices
are unaffected and no benefit accrues in the form of a reduction in
the nominal cost of the prespecified gross investment vector (net
investment plus depreciation). Instead, the owners of capital goods
benefit from an increase in earnings on a given real investment. In the
nonclassical cases, i.e., some degree of forward CIT shifting, capital
consumption (depreciation) has been considered as an intermediate
good, with the benefits of price reductions (more than offset, how.
ever, by imposition of the VAT) flowing to consumers. But in these
cases, it has been argued (section 2.4.4), that capital earnings can no
longer be viewed as quasi-rents, and net earnings of capital enter
into price formation. In this event, capital owners can anticipate re-
ceiving an unchanged flow of net earnings on the basis of a smaller
level of nominal investment (unchanged physical investment). Thus,
the benefit to investors of a decline in capital goods prices is the re-
duction in the nominal cost of the original bill of net investment
purchases. This benefit must be distributed over households accord-
ing to their participation in the purchase of capital goods. Thus,
owners of unincorporated enterprises benefit directly from reduced
nominal investment costs, while owners of corporate stock benefit
indirectly via either higher current dividends, or higher future earn-
ings (capital gains). This contrasts with the classical case of zero CIT
shifting in which the entire (short-run) benefit accrues to owners of
corporate wealth in the form of increased after-tax corporate profits.
In this chapter, changes in the cost of living for each income class
are computed by combining the previously estimated price changes
of consumption goods and services with information on the level
and composition of consumer expenditure by income class, on the
assumption that real consumption expenditure (level and composi-106Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
tion)is unaffected by the tax substitution. Actually, of course, the
shifting of consumption to the new basket that is optimal at the
new relative prices will provide some opportunity for gain, indicating
that the burden of the shift will have been slightly overestimated.
Similarly, unshifted CiTsavingsare allocated to income classes on
the basis of the share of wealth and portfolio composition (common
stock versus other assets) unique to each income class. Finally, the
benefits derived from the reductions in capital goods prices and
hence in the nominal cost of net investment purchases are distributed
on the same basis as the benefits of unshifted CIT savings; that is,
ownership of corporate wealth is taken as a proxy for participation
in current capital expenditure.2 The sum of these effects, i.e., the
increase in nominal consumption expenditure less (a) the increase in
income, and (b) the reduction in investment cost, relative to income
then represents the differential incidence of the tax substitution by
income class. This information is further summarized by computing
a Gini-coefficient, or index of concentration, which permits an
(albeit somewhat arbitrary) assessment of the change in the overall
degree of inequality in income distribution which results from the
VAT-CIT substitution.
In almost all actual cases of VAT imposition, a system of multi-
ple rates has been set up to mitigate the obvious regressivity of the
tax by partially or wholly exempting some consumer goods deemed
to be "necessities." We shall assess the implications of these dual
rate systems, and we suggest and evaluate alternative means of re-
ducing the regressivity of tax systems that incorporate the VAT.
To simplify matters the analysis is restricted to the extreme cases
of complete repeal of the CIT under the polar assumptions of full or
zero forward CIT shifting. These extremes most clearly delimit and
exemplify the range of redistributive consequences of a VAT-CIT
substitution.
Since the tax substitution analysis is based on data relating to
input-output relationships, final demands, and corporate income
tax liabilities observed in 1969, it is necessary for consistency to use
the 1969 level and distribution of consumption expenditure by
income class. These 1969 income-consumption relationships have
been estimated from 1960—61 data, which are the most recent that
2. In principle, ownership of corporate wealth, weighted by the corporate
share of net investment, plus ownership of noncorporate physical capital,
weighted by the noncorporate share of net investment, would be employed to
distribute these benefits, }Iowever, the required information is not readily
available by income class, and itislikely that the distribution of corporate
wealth would be highly correlated with the weighted distribution of total physi-
cal wealth particularly because of the predominance of net corporate capital
formation (in excess of 75 percent of the total).Income Distribution: Differential Incidence of the VA T-CIT Substitution107
aresufficiently disaggregated [U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics].
Two alternative assumptions concerning the responses of consump-
tion patterns to the relative price changes which occurred between
1960 and 1969 have been used to convert 1960 consumption pat-
terns to 1969 prices:
a. The percentage distribution of nominal expenditures over
consumption commodities for a given 1969 income class is assumed
to be identical to that of the 1960-61 income class having the same
real income. This is implied by unitary relative-price elasticity of
demand. The adjustment of real levels of consumption of each
good and service to relative price changes is just sufficient to main-
tain the budgetary shares, for a given income class, for each com-
modity.
b. Alternatively, it can be assumed that the level of real con-
sumption of each good and service for a 1969 income class will be
identical to that of the 1960-61 income class having the same
real income. This would be implied by zero relative price elasticity
of demand. In this case, the share of expenditure accounted for by
the goods and services with above-average price increases would be
greater in1969than in1960,while the share of expenditure ac-
counted for by those with below-average price increases (relative
price reductions) would decline.
The computations of the redistributive results are made under
both price.elasticity assumptions. However, since the estimated in-
cidence of the tax substitution is relatively insensitive to the elas-
ticity assumptions, the discussion is confined to the less extreme
case of unitary elasticity. But, it should be understood that the
alternative elasticity assumptions have been employed only in con-
verting 1960-61 consumer budget composition to 1969 consumer
prices. Zero elasticity is assumed in both cases in the assessment of
theredistributiveeffectsof the tax-substitution-inducedprice
changes, i.e., the composition of real 1969 consumption is assumed
to be unaltered by the price changes resulting from the tax sub-
stitution. Real consumption patterns have not been permitted to
respond to these price changes for the sake of simplicity and of
consistency with the input-output assumption of a fixed vector of
final consumption demands. The data underlying the incidence
analysis are presented in Table 4-1.
4.1INCOME REDISTRIBUTION WITH FULL
CIT SHIFTING
Considerfirst the impact of the VAT-CIT substitution on income

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Income Distribution: Differential Incidence of the VA T-CIT Substitution109
benefitsof CIT repeal arefullyshifted forward in the form of
lower prices, there will be no changes in nominal income, i.e., net-of-
tax profits and other factor incomes are unaffected. As indicated in
the preceding chapter, the CIT-compensating VAT rate in this case
is 7.22 percent. VAT-inclusive consumer prices rise on average by
about 1.70 percent. However, because of differing initial corporate
tax liabilities, consumer prices will not move uniformly. The tax
substitution implies VAT-inclusive price increases in excess of 3
percent in such important, but relatively unincorporated, sectors
as foods and services. The most important price decreases occur in
the capital-intensive and highly incorporated utilities and communi-
cations sectors (decreases of 3 percent or more). The effect on
consumption expenditure will then clearly be sensitive to the com-
position of the consumption budget.
The percentage increases in overall consumption costs by income
class, as indicated in Table 4—2, are 2.3 percent and 2.5 percent for
the lowest income classes, 2.5 percent for the highest, and 2.1 per-
cent for the middle. The above-average increase for the lowest in-
come classis accounted for by the substantial price increases for
food, housing, and medical care, which collectively account for
about 57 percent of household expenditure at this income level.
The importance of these three items declines continuously with in-
creases in income. The below-average increases in the middle income
range are primarily accounted for by the decline in the price of
private transportation. which takes a greater share of the budget at
these income levels than at any others.
These changes in consumption expenditures effectively represent
net changes in tax burden on consumption account, i.e., reductions in
real disposable income resulting from the tax substitution. In addi-
tion, households will benefit, directly or indirectly, from the re-
duction in capital goods prices resulting from forward CIT shifting,
a benefit not offset by the imposition of a VAT liability. The ag-
gregate benefit of capital goods price changes is simply the reduction
in the nominal cost of the fixed level of real net investment. To
distribute these benefits over income classes the distribution of
corporate common stockholdings is used as a proxy for direct
participation in net capital formation. For a given income class, its
benefit per dollar of income (benefit as a percentage of income) due
to the reduction in capital prices is obtained as follows: the total
share of common stock held by individuals in the income class (the
ratio of the total value of common stock held by individuals in the
income class to the total value of common stock held by individuals
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gIncome Distribution: Differential Incidence of the VA T-CIT Substitution111
vestmentpurchases and divided by aggregate income of the class. The
distribution of stock ownership is shown in Table 4—i, column 6,
and the resultant investment cost savings as a proportion of income
are in Table 4-2, column 1.
Presumably because of the concentration of retired rentiers in the
lowest income class, net investment savings as a percentage of income
are as high or higher in the two lowest income classes as in the next
higher classes. Not surprisingly, the gain is greatest for the highest
income group (income in excess of $15,000), although average
family stockholdings in this class were probably understated. The
percentage gain ranges from a low of 0.2 percent for the $5,000—
$7,499 income class to 2.4 percent at incomes about $15,000
(with incomes expressed in 1960-61 dollars).
The resultant total net incidence of the tax substitution, with CIT
repeal and full shifting, is simply the algebraic sum of the increases in
consumption expenditures plus reductions in investment expendi-
tures, expressed as a percentage of income. For this purpose, the
change in consumption expenditure must be expressed as a per-
centage of income, rather than of expenditure itself. This is done
simply by multiplying by the pre-tax-substitution ratio of expendi-
ture to income (the average propensity to consume) by the per-
centage increase in consumption expenditure, i.e.,
-
where is the change in consumption expenditure and C and Y
are the original (presubstitution) levels of expenditure and income,
respectively. The incidence of net investment savings (investment
cost reduction) is already expressed as a percentage of income. Thus,
the full net incidence is given by the sum of the two components:
_Y Y Y Y
whereis the reduction in net investment expenditure; and it is
displayed in the last two columns of Table 4-2.
Not surprisingly, since the average propensity to consume de-
clines with income, while stock ownership rises with income class,
the tax substitution with full CIT shifting is generally regressive: The
net incidence declines from 1.9 percent at the lowest income class to
approximately zero at incomes of $10,000-$14,999, and is negative
about $15,000. Thus, even under the most favorable assumption of112Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
fullforward shifting of the CIT savings, the effect of the VAT-CIT
substitution is to redistribute income from lower to higher income
classes.
To quantify this effect, Gini coefficients, or indices of concen-
tration, were computed for the original income distribution and for
the income distribution resulting from the tax substitution. This
coefficient effectively measures the degree to which the full dis-
tribution diverges from income equality. A Gini coefficient of zero
would imply absolute family-income equality; the most extreme in-
equality would result in a coefficient of unity. The pre-tax-substitu-
tion Gini coefficient for the disposable income distribution had a
value of 0.374; the tax substitution increases the coefficient to only
0.380, suggesting that the tax substitution results in only marginal
changes in relative incomes.3
It should be pointed out that the first-round aggregate effect
of the tax substitution, in an open economy, is to increase taxes paid
by citizens of the government imposing the tax. The aggregate
burden on U.S. taxpayers would increase simply because part of the
advantage of the CIT reduction would redound to the benefit of
foreign purchasers of U.S. exports. The aggregate benefit of the sub-
stitution to the rest of the world (or aggregate burden on domestic
taxpayers), under the present assumption of full CIT removal and
full forward shifting, would be in fact approximately $2.54 billion,
on the basis of original export sales of $47.49 billion and a reduction
in export prices of 5.35 percent.
4.2INCOME REDISTRIBUTION WITH ZERO
CIT SHIFTING
Underthe classical assumption of zero CIT shifting, it is somewhat
simpler to assess the effects of the VAT-CIT substitution on income
redistribution. First, because export prices are unaffected, no benefit
3. The arbitrary nature of the Gini coefficient should be recognized in
interpreting it as a measure of change in the degree of distributional inequality
resulting from a public policy measure, e.g., the VAT-CIT substitution. As
Vickrey has pointed out, very different patterns of income distribution are
consistent with a particular value of the Gini coefficient: a concept of dis-
tributive justice may distinguish very clearly between two income-distributional
policies which generate virtually identical measures of inequality. Specifically,
in the present case, peculiarities in the relationship between tax burden and
income at very low levels of income (less than $5,000 or $7,500) may dis-
guise the significant regressivity of the tax substitution over the bulk of the
income range, i.e., above $5,000. For a further discussion, see Shoup [1970,
pp. 580-581].- --'V.. —
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accruesto the rest of the world: the weighted average domestic in-
cidence of the tax change is zero. Secondly, capital goods prices do
not change, implying no benefit on net investment account. Thus,
it is necessary to consider only changes in consumption expenditure
and the distribution of the increase in net-of-tax profits.
The increase in net corporate profits is simply the original CIT
revenue ($42.68 billion). This increase can be distributed over in-
come classes the same way as were net investment cost savings: the
aggregate change in profit is multiplied by the share of aggregate
common stock held by a particular income class, and the result is
divided by the aggregate income of that class, giving the relative
benefit of the profit increase as a proportion of income of the aver-
age family in that income class, as reflected in increased stock
dividends or capital gains or both.
Not surprisingly, the profit effect with zero CIT shifting is sig-
nificantly greater than investment savings with full CIT shifting.
The aggregate benefit from investment savings (the change in in-
vestment goods prices times original net investment) was only
$6.82 billion, compared to the $42.68 billion increase in net profit.
Thus, regressivity with zero shifting should be much greater than
with full shifting.
The ratio of increase in net profits to income by income
class, is shown in Table 4-3. Again, because of the distribution of
stock ownership, the benefit is greater below an income of $5,000
(3.4 percent for the lowest income class and 4.4 percent for the next
higher one) than for the $5,000 to $7,499 class (Lipercent).The









Less than $3,000 .034 .0768 .091 .057
$3,000-$4,999 .044 .0768 .075 .031
$5,000-$7,499 .011 .0768 .074 .063
$7,500-$9,999 .043 .0768 .069 .026
$1O,000—$14,999 .072 .0768 .065 -.007
$15,000 and more .102 .0768 .053 -.049
= profitincrease (Original CIT Revenue) = $42.68 billion. The VAT
rate (Z) = 7.68 percent and the consumption price index (nc)=1.0768.
Note: Gini coefficient (g) = 0.374 before taxsubstitutionand 0.397 after
substitution.114Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
greatestincrease in nominal income (10.2 percent) was in the high-
est income group.
To the gainonprofit account must be added the effect of the
price changes on consumption expenditure. With zero CIT shifting
this effect is also somewhat simpler: all consumption prices rise by
exactly the rate of the VAT, 7.68 percent. Obviously, then, the
expenditure required to purchase any prespecified bill of consump-
tion goods will rise by an equivalent amount. To specify the change
in expenditure, by income class, as a proportion of income, it is
only necessary to multiply the VAT rate (rate of expenditure in-
crease) by the average propensity to consume. Because the average
propensity to consume declines continuously with income, the in-
crease in consumption expenditure relative to income also declines
throughout, from 9.1 percent at the lowest levels of income to
only 5.3 percent at the highest (15,000 and above).4
The net incidence (burden) of the VAT-CIT substitution is then




Computed in this manner, the net incidence (burden) with zero
CIT shifting (Table 4-3) ranges from 6.3 percent at incomes from
$5,000 to $7,499 to a -4.9 percent for families with incomes in ex-
cess of $15,000. The incidence for the lowest income group is
5.7 percent.
The pre-tax-substitution Gini-coefficient is 0.374; the post-tax
value is 0.397. Thus, the increase in inequality is much greater with
zero shifting of the CIT than with unitary CIT shifting, for which
the post-tax-substitution coefficient increased to only 0.380. This
substantive increase in the coefficient for zero shifting reflects a
significant divergence from proportionality. Zero shifting implies
a marked redistribution from low income families, who lose as
much as 5.7 percent, and from middle income families, who lose
6.3 percent, to high income families, whose incomes actually increase
by about 5 percent.
To summarize, the degree of regressiveness of a VAT-CIT sub-
stitution depends on assumptions concerning CIT shifting. As ex-
4. The increase in consumption expenditure relative to income for the lowest
income class exceeds the VAT rate because, on average, households in this
income class dissave.Income Distribution: Differential Incidence of the VA T-C/T Substitution115
pected,the most severe regressivityis observed if, in accordance
with classical theory, the CIT is not shifted and the CIT savings
accrue entirely to owners of capital (at least in the short run).
4.3DUAL RATES
Inresponse to this observed regressivity of the VAT-CIT substitution,
or to more superficial conceptions of the "absolute" regressivity of
the VAT, governments have in practice usually exempted some
selected commodities from taxation at the full rates, paralleling the
policy applied in imposing sales taxes.
Because the main objective of such "dual rate" systems is the re-
duction of regressivity, that bill of goods which would necessarily
result in the greatest such reduction was selected for analysis. Specifi-
cally, in order to minimize the burden of the VAT on the lower
income groups, all commodity classes exhibiting an income elasticity
of less than 1 were given VAT preference. The resultant commodity
classes are: food (elasticity of 0.59), tobacco (0.34), housing (0.60),
utilities (0.45), supplies for household operation and personal care
(0.42), and medical care and education (0.76), where the elasticities
are weighted average elasticities computed from income class data
[U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics]. This is obviously not the bill of
goods conventionally exempted from state retail sales taxes.5 In the
aggregate, these commodity classes account for approximately 54
percent of consumer expenditures.
The aggregate VAT-inclusive consumer price index is not affected
by the imposition of dual rates; what is saved on a preferred com-
modity is made up in the aggregate via increased VAT liabilities
on nonexempted commodities. Thus, the differential incidence
effects depend entirely on differences in the composition of con-
sumption budgets between income classes. Hence, the exemption
5. Four reasons for this divergence of conventional exemption practice
from that which most effectively mitigates regressivity can be suggested. First,
the choice of commodities selected for exemption may be guided by other
objectives besides mitigation. For example, externality considerations or moral
judgments concerning the social desirability of some types of consumption may
enter, as in the decision not to exempt tobacco or alcoholic beverages.
Secondly, as will become very clear, the use of dual rate schemes may create
severe distortions in the price structure, resulting in significant inefficiencies
of allocation as households attempt to minimize their tax burdens (legal tax
avoidance achieved by shifting consumption patterns toward exempted com-
modities) and potentially leading to tax evasion: the development of black mar-
kets and other methods of illegal tax avoidance.
Thirdly, and related to the second, many items in income inelastic demand
are also price inelastic, and as is well known, the allocative inefficiency (excess116Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
ofincome-inelastic items minimizes the regressivity of a dual-rate
VAT as a replacement for the CIT.
It should be noted that the exemption of, e.g., tobacco sales to
consumers from the VAT does not mean that retail tobacconists
are exempted from the VAT network. To exempt value added com-
pletely atallstages of production ultimately embodied in con-
sumer purchases of tobacco it would be necessary not only to
exempt the tobacconist but also to provide the retailer with a re-
fund of all VAT invoiced on his purchases. Similarly, ifit were
desired to tax a preferred commodity at one-half the regular VAT
rate, the net VAT liability of the retailer would be one-half the VAT
rate times all preferred sales, less aLlVATinvoiced (at full rates)
on his intermediate purchases. In general, a dual-rate system under
the invoice method requires only that the final sale be identified. as
subject to a preferred rate, with the usual full credit of the VAT in-
voiced on intermediate purchases.
To examaine the sensitivity of incidence to the degree of exemp-
tion, two cases are considered: (a) the application of one-half the
"normal" (non-exempt-commodity) rate •toitems in income-in-
elastic demand, and (b) the complete exemption of (application of a
zero rate to) income-inelastic items. The results are again assessed
for the extreme cases of complete CIT removal with full and zero
forward CIT shifting. The differential incidence of the VAT-CIT
substitution for the three cases of full-rate, half-rate, and zero-rate
VAT preferences is presented in Tables 4-4 (full CIT shifting) and
4-5 (zero CIT shifting).
In the case of CIT repeal and full forward CIT shifting, the in-
troduction of preferential treatment for income-inelastic commodi-
ties increases the normal VAT rate from 7.22 percent to9.89 percent
with half-exemption and to percent, more than double the
single rate, with full exemption. The benefit received on purchases
of exempted commodities is the reduction in the effective VAT rate
burden) imposed by an excise tax is less the more price inelastic the demand.
Thus, on allocative grounds it is desirable to subject these commodities to special
higherratherthan lower rates. The fundamental point, ultimately, is that the
rate structure of ad valorem taxes should be determined on the basis of criteria
other than income distributional effects, with undesirable consequences in the
latter dimension compensated by other simultaneous changes in the tax system,
e.g., rebatable credits against income taxes or an appropriately structured sys-
tem of transfers (negative taxes).
Finally, as a means of enhancing progressivity, exemptions under existing
ad valorem taxes may be "nonoptimal" because they are attempts to make the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Income Distribution: Differential Incidence of the VA T-CIT Substitution119
appliedto these purchases: from 7.22 percent to 4.95 percent (half-
rate) or to 0 percent (zero rate, or full exemption).6
As can be seen from the estimates of net incidence, the half-rate
benefits families with income below about $3,000 at the expense
of those with incomes above $15,000. With full exemption, those
below $7,500 benefit at the expense of those above $10,000. How-
ever, the effect for the overall redistribution is marginal. The post-
substitution Gini-coefficient is reduced from 0.380 (no exemption),
to 0.377 (half and total exemption). Thus, either dual-rate system
moves back only halfway to the presubstitution coefficient of
0.374. Under either dual-rate system the VAT-CIT substitution
isstill markedly regressive above an income of $5,000. However,
families at the lowest income levels (below $5,000) do derive signfi-
cant benefits from exemption, in the extreme (below $3,000) an
increase of 2.3 percent in disposable income (the difference be-
tween for the single rate and the zero rate).
In the case of zero CIT shifting, the absolute magnitudes of the
redistributive effects of dual rates are similar. Again, the benefits
of both full and partial exemptions are concentrated among those
with an income below $7,500. Full exemption, for example, would
increase the disposable income of the lowest income group by 2.7
percent, compared to a single-rate VAT (although the net tax burden
6. Note that the "half-rate," 4.95 percent, is more than one-half the "single
rate," 7.22 percent, simply because the full rate applied to nonexempt com-
modities, 9.89 percent, must be above the single rate to compensate for the
lower rate applied to preferentially treated commodities, and the half rate is
one-half this full rate. In general the relationship between the degree of exemp-





Ze is the rate applied to preferential commodities,
e is the ratio of the preferential to the full rate,
C is total personal consumption expenditure (the VAT base),
p is the proportion of expenditure accounted for by preferential com-
modities, and
R is the required VAT revenue yield.
In the present case with p =0.54and R/C0.0722 (the single VAT rate,
i.e., in the absence of exemptions; assuming full CIT repeal and shifting), the
relationship between e and the VAT rate is120Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
ofthis group would still rise by 3.0 percent in comparison to the
presubstitution level of disposable income). However, because the
substitution with zero CIT shifting is so much more steeply re-
gressive (through the effect of increased profits), the dual-rate
systems are also significantly more regressive compared to the pre-
tax-substitution condition. Without exception, the Gini coefficient
is increased by the tax substitution from 0.374 to 0.397; half-
exemption reduces it only to 0.395, and full exemption has the
almost unnoticeable marginal effect of an 0.001 reduction (to
0.394). But to achieve these relatively minor improvements in
incidence it is necessary to increase the normal VAT rate from 7.68
percent (no exemption) to 10.48 percent (half exemption) and
16.48 percent (full exemption), respectively.
If dual rates only mitigated regressivity, even marginally, they
might be justified. However, apart from their marginal redistributive
effectiveness, they can be expected to have a significant adverse
impact on other dimensions of the economic structure. Note par-
ticularly the radical rate differences which are implied by dual-rate
systems: full rates of about 10 percent versus half rates of 5 percent
or full rates in excess of 15 percent with total exemption of pre-
ferred commodities. The allocative effects of such substantial rate
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necessarilyadverse. With such staggering rate differentials it is hard
to believe that consumer budget composition would not be altered
in an attempt to minimize the burden of the tax. Thus, a dual rate
VAT could entail substantial excess burdens, i.e., losses in welfare
due solely to the peculiarities of the tax system.
In brief, dual rates minimally reduce the regressivity of the VAT.
CIT substitution, but only by sacrificing the major claim which can
be made for the VAT: its allocative neutrality. Even if other benefits
can validly be claimed for the substitution, e.g., growth and trade
advantages (the validity of which will be discussed in succeeding
sections), or elimination of biases against equity financing, these
could be achieved much more efficiently by other means, e.g.,
investment credits and devaluation or various forms of integra-
tion of personal and corporate income taxes, without incurring
either the adverse allocative or redistributive effects of dual- or
single-rate VAT systems.
However, alternatives to dual rate systems can be suggested to
offset the regressivity of the substitution, and render it redistribu-
tively neutral or desirable. These can only be discussed here briefly.
The least radical means would be to permit VAT liabilities to be
credited against federal personal income taxliabilities.For this
method to work it would be necessary, first, that net credits, i.e.,
the excess of gross credits for the VAT over gross personal income
tax liabilities, be refunded to the taxpayer, and second, that the
degree of credit depend upon income, declining as income rises.7
Under this method either the VAT rate would have to be increased,
so that reduced income tax revenues would be compensated by in-
creased VAT revenues, implying VAT rates significantly higher than
those discussed here, or changes in the level and structure of in-
come tax rates would have to be introduced to compensate for the
aggregate net income tax revenue loss resulting from the VAT credit.
In either case, the net incidence of the change in tax structure would
result from compensating changes in three tax instruments: the VAT,
the C1T, and the personal income tax. Changes in the structure and
yield of the latter would have to be explicitly incorporated into
the analysis if the consequences of the tax substitution were to be
assessed.
A more substantial change in tax structure which could also
7. Note that the use of rebatable credits would require that all households
file income tax returns, even those whose income is so low that they are not
otherwise subject to the income tax. This would involve a quantum leap in the
administrative burden of the income tax, particularly since the tax reform act
of 1969.122Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
serveto offset the regressivity of the VAT-CIT substitution would
be the simultaneous introduction of a progressive expenditures tax
(PET) [Kaldor]Atone extreme, the PET could be designed so
that, by applying appropriate negative and positive PET rates, the
net incidence of the PET-augmented VAT-CIT substitution would
be reduced to zero on average for any income class (or to a positive
constant, i.e., a tax liability proportionate to income, if the CIT
were shifted forward, since that would imply a net increase in
domestic tax liabilities due to the benefit accruing to the rest of
the world in the form of lower export prices).
At the other extreme, it would be possible to dispense with the
VAT completely, relying only on the PET to compensate for CIT
removal. In that case, any desired degree of progressivity could be
built into the substitution simply by manipulating the PET rate
structure. Of course, much the same effects could be obtained by
using the personal income tax to compensate for corporate tax
removal, e.g., by integrating corporate and personal income tax-
ation and by introducing appropriate simultaneous changes in the
rate structure of the latter. However, the two alternatives are not
indentical. In terms of consumption and savings effects major dif-
ferences could be expected. Thus, the personal income tax and the
PET offer basically different alternatives for replacement of the
CIT or mitigation of VAT regressivity. In terms of incentive effects,
it might be noted, the PET would more closely approximate the
VAT than would the personal income tax, particularly with refer-
ence to the trade and investment effects discussed in the following
chapters.
8. Administration of the progressive expenditures tax entails certain dif-
ficulties, although these are not insurmountable. In a regime already employing
an income tax, introduction of PET would require in addition only the computa-
tion of annual flows into or out of investment, or to or from gifts and bequests.